Summary
In this note, I submit that the prescriptive period for the violation of a special law is interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court, pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court en banc in Zaldivia v. Reyes (1992). The exception is a prosecution for a violation of the Securities Regulation Code wherein prescription is interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the SEC or upon investigation by the SEC, pursuant to the Court’s en banc ruling in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation (2008).
In my previous post, I advanced the view that the prescriptive period for the running of the prosecution of a BP 22 offense is interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court, not when the complaint is filed with the prosecutor’s office. My reason was that since the coverage of the Rules on Summary Procedure was extended to B.P. 22 cases on 15 April 2003, therefore Section 11 of the Rules, which in effect provides that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint or information, would govern.
In this note, I advance another, more fundamental, reason: Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, which purports to overturn the doctrine laid down in Zaldivia v. Reyes that the prescriptive period for violations of special laws is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint or information, actually did not. Hence the Zaldivia doctrine should still be considered as the controlling case law.
Law on Prescriptive Period re violations of Ordinances and Special Laws
A vintage law, Act No. 3326 (1926), provides for the rules regarding prescriptive periods for the violation of ordinances and special laws. Section 2 of the law reads as follows:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
“The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
Zaldivia (1992)
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance by quarrying without a permit on 11 May 1990 in Rodriguez, Rizal. A complaint was filed by the police with the prosecutor’s office on 30 May 1990 but the corresponding information was filed with the municipal trial court only on 2 October 1990. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription, pointing out that under Act No. 3326, violations penalized by ordinances shall prescribe after two months from the commission of the offense. The accused pointed out that the information was filed in court after more than two months from its commission. The prosecution on the other hand argued that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor’s office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period pursuant to Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Supreme Court en banc held that the crime had prescribed since the information was filed in court only on 2 October 1990 or more than two months from the commission of the offense on 11 May 1990. The Court held that under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the period of prescription shall be interrupted “when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party” and that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are “judicial proceedings.” Although Zaldivia involved a violation of an ordinance, the holding therein is applicable mutatis mutandis to violations of special laws since Act No. 3326 covers “violations penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances.”
Recognition of the Zaldivia doctrine is found in Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that “[t]he institution of the criminal action [by the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor or other proper officer] shall interrupt the running of the prescriptive period of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.” (Italics supplied). It is clear from the wording of the provision that in case of conflict between Section 1 of Rule 110 on one hand, and a special law on the other, it is the latter which will prevail. The reason for this is that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. (See Zaldivia v. Reyes).
Panaguiton (2008)
However in Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), a prosecution for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Supreme Court, through its second division, held that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor’s office already tolled the running of the prescriptive period even if the offense is for the violation of a special law. The Supreme Court held that the word “proceedings” in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 by which prescription is interrupted should be deemed to refer to proceedings both judicial or executive in character. It pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed in 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.”
On the assumption that it has doctrinal force, Panaguiton in effect reversed the doctrine laid down by the Court en banc in Zaldivia. It should be noted that in Zaldivia, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the People, had also made the submission that “proceedings” in Section 2 should be deemed to include administrative proceedings but this view was rejected by the Court. This shows that Panaguiton was not just a modification but an outright reversal of the Zaldivia doctrine. The decision in Panaguition however was laid down only by a division of the Court. The question is: can a division of the Court effectively reverse a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc?
Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution is quite clear that the answer is in the negative. It states “that no doctrine or principle laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.”
SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation (2008) did not modify or reverse Zaldivia except insofar as violations of the SRC are concerned
In Panaguiton, the following “disquisition” was ascribed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, 576 SCRA 354 (2008):
“While it may be observed that the term ‘judicial proceedings’ in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before ‘investigation and punishment’ in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term ‘proceedings’ should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.”
If Panaguiton may not be deemed to have reversed Zaldivia, may the decision in SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation, which was rendered en banc, be deemed to have overturned Zaldivia because of the above disquisition?
The answer should still be in the negative. A perusal of Interport Resources shows that the “disquisition” is not found anywhere in its text. Instead it is found in a concurring opinion. It is axiomatic that concurring or separate opinions do not form part of the decision itself and do not have any doctrinal value or controlling force.
Interport Resources involved an investigation by the SEC against certain corporate officers for the violation of the insider trading provisions of the Revised Securities Act, re-enacted during the pendency of the case as the Securities Regulation Code. Applying Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period for insider trading would be 12 years. The respondents argued that their criminal liability had been extinguished by prescription pursuant to Act No. 3326 since no complaint or information was filed in court within the 12-year prescriptive period.
The Court en banc held that the prosecution of offenses punishable under the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio pursuant to Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code. Hence the SEC investigation for insider trading interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. The ratio decidendi of Interport Resources is therefore anchored on Section 53.1 of the SRC (not on any re-interpretation of Act 3326) and hence its holding is limited to violations of the Securities Regulation Code or its implementing rules and regulations. Nothing in Interport Resources was intended to reverse the Zaldivia doctrine insofar as violations of other special laws are concerned. In fact the Zaldivia case was not even mentioned in Interport Resources.
Prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Intellectual Property Code
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997), and Sanrio Company Ltd. v. Lim, 546 SCRA 303 (2008), which involve a prosecution, respectively, for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Intellectual Property Code, the Supreme Court held that the running of the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman (in Ingco) and with the Department of Justice (in Sanrio). Both of these cases were cited by Panaguiton to support its ruling. It is submitted however that the holdings in these cases have no controlling force since like Panaguiton, these were laid down only by a division and not by the full court. Hence the holdings laid down therein cannot be deemed as having reversed or modified the Zaldivia doctrine.
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