In this note, I submit that the running of the prescriptive period for the prosecution of a BP 22 offense is interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court, not when the complaint is filed with the prosecutor’s office.
Law on Prescriptive Period re violations of Ordinances and Special Laws
Applying a vintage law, Act No. 3326 (1926), the prescriptive period for the violation of BP 22 would be four years. The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the commission of the offense, that is, from the dishonor of the check.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 states when the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and1 the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
“The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
Zaldivia Case
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the Court en banc held that Section 2 refers to judicial proceedings and hence the running of the prescriptive period for violations of ordinances and special laws was interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court. The court also held that since cases involving the violation of an ordinance are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court, pursuant to Section 9 thereof.
Panaguiton
However in Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), a prosecution for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Supreme Court, through its second division, held that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor’s office already tolled the running of the prescriptive period even if the offense is for the violation of a special law. The Supreme Court held that the word “proceedings” in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 by which prescription is interrupted should be deemed to refer to proceedings both judicial or executive in character. It pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed in 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and that the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. The ruling in Panaguiton was reiterated in People v. Pangilinan, 672 SCRA 105 (2012).
Coverage of Rules on Summary Procedure extended to BP 22 cases
It is submitted however that at the most the Panaguiton and Pangilinan rulings should apply only to violations of special laws not covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. For criminal cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Zaldivia ruling should still prevail, pursuant to Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Thus the prescriptive period for the crime of slight physical injuries would be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or the information in court. It should be noted that at the times material to Panaguiton and Pangilinan, violations of B.P. Blg. 22 were not yet covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The coverage of such rules was extended to B.P. Blg. 22 cases only on 15 April 2003. It is submitted that because of this, the Panaguiton and Pangilinan rulings are no longer good case law and hence the running of the prescriptive period for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 is interrupted only upon the filing of the case in court.
-oOo-
- The word “and” should be read as “until” (FLORENZ D. REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS 332 [4th ed.], citing People v. Duque, G.R. No. 100285, 13 August 1992). ↩︎
