Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure defines a prejudicial question by providing for its elements:
“Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.”
Because both the civil and the criminal courts have the competence to pass upon the similar or intimately related issue, the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the pendency of a prejudicial question in the civil case is a ground for the suspension of the criminal case. The rationale behind this principle is to avoid conflicting decisions between tribunals and to prevent the unnecessary burden of criminal prosecution when the resolution of a civil issue could render such prosecution moot.
In the case of Natividad-Florentino v. Florentino, G.R. No. 255335, 27 August 2025, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether a civil case for nullification of the first marriage poses a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.
The facts are straightforward. Antonio contracted marriage with Marilou in 1984. He then contracted a second marriage with Victoria in 1999. In 2012, Antonio filed with the RTC a petition to nullify his first marriage to Marilou, contending that the marriage was void because of the absence of a marriage ceremony. Shortly thereafter, upon the complaint of Victoria, the criminal case for bigamy was filed against Antonio in the RTC. Antonio then moved to suspend the bigamy case and defer arraignment because of the pendency of a prejudicial question in the marriage nullification case.
Based on the definition of a prejudicial question, the issue of whether Antonio’s first marriage to Marilou was void should raise a prejudicial question. If the civil court rules that the first marriage was void, that would mean that the criminal action for bigamy may no longer proceed. This is because the nullity of the first or second marriage is an absolute defense in a bigamy case (Pulido v. People, 908 Phil. 573 [2021]). In Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960), cited in Pulido, the Court held that an action for nullification of the second marriage raises a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
The Supreme Court in Natividad-Florentino, however, held that the marriage nullification case does not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal case for bigamy. In fine, the Court stated that since the criminal court had the competence to pass upon the issue of the first marriage’s validity, such issue cannot pose a prejudicial question:
“All the more, the criminal action must proceed in order for the accused, Antonio, to substantiate his defense of nullity before the trial court. ln resolving this, it is within the competence of the trial court to receive evidence and adjudicate on the matter of the validity of the first marriage. Consequently, the pendency of his civil action for declaration of nullity is rendered irrelevant to the continuation of the prosecution for bigamy.”
With due respect, the ratio decidendi leads to a catch-22 situation. The holding in effect states that a prejudicial question will warrant the suspension of the criminal case provided that the prejudicial question is not within the competence of the criminal court to adjudicate. However, a prejudicial question necessarily presupposes that both the criminal and the civil courts have the competence to pass upon the prejudicial question. Natividad-Florentino would virtually obliterate the concept of prejudicial question or its utility as a procedural device for suspending the criminal action. It thus deserves an earnest re-examination.
The Court also stated that “[a]llowing the mere filing of a petition for nullity to suspend criminal prosecution would create a dangerous precedent that would enable delay or evasion of liability simply by initiating civil proceedings.” This fear is assuaged by the requirement that the prejudicial question must arise from a “previously instituted civil action.” At any rate, this is a policy question that is properly addressed by an amendment of the pertinent rules.
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