In People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, 29 September 2020 (en banc), an information was filed in the RTC charging the accused with murder committed in 2008. Under the Revised Penal Code, any person found guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposition of the death penalty had already been prohibited by R.A. No. 9346 which provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in lieu of capital punishment.
Upon his arraignment in 2009, the accused pleaded guilty to the crime charged. The trial court, applying Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, scheduled four hearing dates for the prosecution to present its witnesses to prove the accused’s guilt and degree of culpability. Section 3 of Rule 116 provides that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the guilty plea and require the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. The prosecution however failed to present any witness. Nonetheless, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on his guilty plea and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The trial court stated that the accused maintained his plea despite being apprised that he will be sentenced and imprisoned on the basis thereof.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged on the basis solely of the his guilty plea and despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA rendered a decision setting aside the accused’s conviction because of the RTC’s failure to observe the mandate of Section 3 of Rule 116, especially the duty to require the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt. The CA remanded the case to the RTC with the directive that it follow the mandate of Section 3 of Rule 116.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the CA should not have remanded the case but should have instead acquitted him for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court found merit in the accused’s argument. The Court reversed the CA’s decision and acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Six justices dissented, agreeing with the CA’s directive to remand the case to the trial court for compliance with Section 3 of Rule 116.
A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the arraignment may be punished with death. (Section 6 of Rule 114, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 116). The Supreme Court laid the foundation for its ruling by noting that murder remains a capital offense despite the prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty. The Court, citing People v. Albert, 251 SCRA 136 (1995), stated that “in case death was found to be the imposable penalty, the same would only have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition against the imposition of the capital punishment, but the nature of the offense of murder as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes properly characterized as capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of a non-capital offense.”
The dissenters found no issue with the application of Section 3 of Rule 116. However they argue that rather than acquitting the accused, the Court should have instead remanded the case to the trial court for compliance with Section 3 of Rule 116. The Court addressing this argument held that a remand was not proper since the prosecution was given adequate opportunity to present evidence of the accused’s guilt but failed to do so. Hence the accused was entitled to an acquittal because of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In Part 2 of this note, I submit that the Pagal holding deserves an earnest re-examination. My view is that there is presently no capital offense because of the prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty. Hence Section 3 of Rule 116 was inapplicable and the accused was properly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 4 of Rule 116 governing a plea of guilty to a non-capital offense.
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More power to you sir!