Prior Declaration of Heirship in Ordinary Civil Action to Protect or Enforce Hereditary Rights: An Analysis of Treyes v. Larlar

Summary

In the recent en banc case of Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, 8 September 2020, the Supreme Court declared that “the rule laid down in [Ypon v. Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778 (2013)], Yaptinchay, Portugal …and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.”

In this note, I submit that based on Treyes’ ratio decidendi, Ypon and its companion cases should be deemed abandoned only insofar as they refer to ordinary civil actions filed by the plaintiff wherein the fact of his or her heirship is indisputable or uncontroverted or where probate proceedings have already been terminated and closed.  In such a case, there is no need for a prior declaration of heirship.  However where the plaintiff’s heirship has not been established by him or is bona fide disputed by the defendant, the ordinary civil action should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The reason is that the declaration of heirship may be made only in the appropriate  proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate and not in an ordinary civil action.

Case law prior to Treyes

The case law prior to Treyes was that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.  They cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, such as one for recovery of property. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in the proper proceedings to settle the deceased’s estate.  (Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, 304 SCRA 18 [1999]). 

In Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance of real property against respondent.   Petitioners alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) who died intestate and childless and that respondent had executed a fraudulent affidavit of self-adjudication claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno and thus was able to obtain title in his name over the subject realty.  Petitioners prayed that the affidavit of self-adjudication and the certificate of title issued in respondent’s name be nullified and that the real property be reconveyed to them. 

The Supreme Court held that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.  Petitioner’s allegation that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno is not enough to make them real parties-in-interest since the determination of whether they are lawful heirs can be made only in the appropriate special proceeding and not in an ordinary suit for cancellation of title and reconveyance. (Citing Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, 581 SCRA 70 [2009]; Heirs of Yaptinchay v. del Rosario, 304 SCRA 18 [1999]).  Hence the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.      

It should be emphasized, as noted by Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Treyes, that “[p]etitioners [in Ypon] only claimed being the collateral relatives and successors-in-interest of the decedent but did not present any evidence regarding such claim” and thus “the allegation regarding the heirship was completely unsubstantiated.”

By way of exception, the need for a prior declaration of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.  (Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte).  In an action for recovery of ownership and possession of land, the court could pass upon the issue of heirship if the parties voluntarily submitted such issue to the court. (Heirs of Fabillar v. Paller, 21 January 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J.).

Also, where the plaintiff’s status as heir is indisputable or uncontroverted (as is usually the case where the plaintiff is a legitimate child or surviving spouse of the decedent), a prior declaration of heirship is not required. (Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, 734 SCRA 625, 634 [2014]; Raymundo v. Vda. de Suarez, 572 SCRA 384, 406-407 [2008]).

Treyes v. Larlar

In Treyes, a woman died leaving her husband (petitioner) and her seven siblings (private respondents) as her sole heirs.  The petitioner then executed affidavits of self-adjudication under Rule 74 averring that he was the sole heir and causing the registration of his wife’s real property under his sole name.  The private respondents thus filed with the RTC an action for annulment of the affidavits and for reconveyance against the petitioner.  

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the private respondents’ complaint because the preliminary determination of the private respondents’ status as legal heirs of their deceased sister in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of estate property. 

Parenthetically, it should be noted that petitioner’s motion to dismiss is actually anchored not on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but on failure to state a cause of action.  Jurisprudence provides that the defense that there was no prior declaration of plaintiff’s heirship is a defense that the plaintiff not having been declared an heir is not a real party-in-interest, thus resulting in the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. (Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte).  

The motion to dismiss was denied by the RTC.  The denial of his motion to dismiss was challenged by the petitioner in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contending that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion. The CA denied the petition for certiorari and this denial was elevated to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.  

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s denial of the petition for certiorari.  The Supreme Court held that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was no need for a prior determination of the private respondents’ status as heirs before they could bring the action for annulment of the affidavits of self-adjudication and for reconveyance of the estate property.  In making its ruling, the Supreme Court placed great weight on the fact that the private respondents’ status as siblings and heirs of their deceased sister was uncontroverted and indisputable, as shown among others by their birth certificates, which being public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The matter could have ended there.  After all, the only issue raised was whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.  Clearly the RTC did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion since its ruling was in accordance with extant jurisprudence that a prior declaration of heirship is not required where the plaintiff’s status as heir is indisputable or uncontroverted. 

Conflict between two groups of cases is only apparent

The Supreme Court however proceeded to re-examine and to “clarify” what it saw as conflicting rulings on the requirement of a prior declaration of heirship.  On one hand, the Supreme Court cited the rulings in De Vera v. Galauran, 67 Phil. 213 (1939) and other cases which held that a prior declaration of heirship is not needed for an heir to bring an action for the protection or vindication of his successional rights, the reason being that the rights to the succession are vested upon the heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death per Article 777 of the Civil Code.   The Supreme Court then ranged against the De Vera cases, the cases of Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal; Reyes, Gabatan, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession. 

It is submitted that the conflict between the De Vera cases and the Ypon cases is only an apparent one.  The two groups of cases can be reconciled.  In the De Vera cases, the heirship of the plaintiffs was either indisputable or uncontroverted or had been passed upon by the court with the parties’ consent.  Plain horse sense tells us that there is no more need to establish or declare what is indisputable or uncontroverted. 

On the other hand, in Ypon and its companion cases, the plaintiffs’ heirship was not established by them or was bona fide disputed by the defendants.  In such a situation, the plaintiff’s status as heir must be established in the appropriate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased and not in an ordinary civil action. To hold otherwise would be to throw a spanner on the legal machinery established under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court for settling the estate of a deceased person and to open the door to multiplicity of suits and the possibility of conflicting rulings. 

Illustrations

Let us consider the factual milieu of Treyes.   The wife died leaving her husband and siblings as sole heirs.  The husband then executed an affidavit of self-adjudication arrogating to himself the real property left by his wife.  In such a situation, the siblings could file a civil action for the annulment of the affidavit of self-adjudication and for reconveyance of the property.  A prior declaration of heirship is not required for the husband could hardly contest the status of his siblings-in-law as heirs of his deceased wife.  This is the situation properly covered by the ratio of Treyes.

Let us consider however another situation.   Husband H died leaving his wife W as his only heir or so it seems.  The wife thus executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the real property left by her husband.  Subsequently, X, who claims to be an illegitimate child of H, filed an action to annul the affidavit of self-adjudication and for reconveyance of the real property.  W disputes X’s claim of filiation.  In this case, it is submitted that the action should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.  X’s status as the heir of H should be established in the proper proceeding for the settlement of the estate of H and not in an ordinary civil action. 

It should be noted that X is not limited to filing a petition for the settlement of the estate of H to obtain a declaration of his (X’s) heirship.  Since the wife had availed of the affidavit of self-adjudication under Rule 74, one may presume that H died intestate and without debts. X can thus file a special civil action for partition of H’s estate.   An action for partition is a mode of settling a decedent’s estate (Butiong v. Plazo, 5 August 2015, Peralta, J.) and in this action X can obtain a declaration of his filiation to H after presenting competent and relevant evidence of the same.  In this special civil action for partition, H can seek the partition of the co-owned estate in which he can pray also for the incidental reliefs of annulment of the affidavit of self-adjudication and of reconveyance.

Admittedly, the Treyes ruling, from its tenor, does not distinguish whether or not the plaintiff’s status as heir is indisputable or uncontroverted.  It is submitted however that the ratio of Treyes can be applied only to cases wherein the plaintiff’s heirship is indisputable or uncontroverted.

Ratio decidendi is the material facts of the case, plus the decision made in relation to those facts. (Holland & Webb, LEARNING LEGAL RULES 150; GOODHART, LEARNING THE LAW 57 [3^rd ed., 1950). Anything else said in the case that does not relate to the material facts is obiter dictum.  (Id. 155).  Only the ratio constitutes binding precedent. (GATMAYTAN, LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 3.0, p. 283).  The material fact in Treyes was that the private respondents’ status as heirs was indisputable and uncontested. Insofar as ordinary civil actions where plaintiff’s status as heir has not been established or is in dispute, the Treyes ruling should be properly considered as obiter dictum.  

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