Rule 22 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule for computing reglementary periods:
“In computing any period of time prescribed and allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. [S1 R22, emphasis supplied]
“Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period. [S2 R22, emphasis supplied]”
The Rule finds special application in computing the allowable period left to a movant after the denial of his motion for reconsideration or new trial under Section 3 of Rule 64 (Petition for review of judgments or final orders of COA or COMELEC) or after the denial of his motion to dismiss or motion for a bill of particulars.
Justice Jose Y. Feria wrote that Rule 22 applies the ruling in Lloren v. De Veyra (4 SCRA 637 [1962]). He also cites De las Alas v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 200) to illustrate the rule. (JOSE Y. FERIA, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 73-74 [1997]).
In Lloren, the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance was received by Lloren on 18 March 1958. On the 15th day after 18 March or on 2 April 1958, Lloren filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order received by Lloren on 16 April 1958. Lloren filed his appeal the next day, 17 April 1958. The Supreme Court held that Lloren’s appeal was timely filed. Since Lloren filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day, that day should be excluded from the computation so that when he received the order denying his motion on 16 April, he still had one day left within which to take his appeal.
In De las Alas, petitioner received a copy of the trial court’s decision on 9 September 1972. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 7 October 1972 (the appeal period was then 30 days) and he received a copy of the order denying his motion on 16 November 1972. The question was how many more days did the petitioner have to file his appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner only had two days left or up to 18 November 1972, applying the ruling in Federal Films, Inc. v. David, 78 Phil. 472, which included the day of the filing of the motion for reconsideration in the time consumed by the petitioner. The Supreme Court reversed the CA and held that the petitioner had three more days to file the appeal or up to 19 November 1972, since the day when he filed the motion for reconsideration should be excluded from the computation. S2 R22 adopts the method of computation used in Lloren and in De las Alas while abandoning that used in Federal Films. (Note: At the time of the Lloren and De las Alas cases, the ruling in Neypes v. CA, 14 September 2005, that a movant has a fresh appeal period from notice of the order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration, had not yet been issued).
However, in two cases involving a petition for review under Rule 64, the Supreme Court applied the method of computation used in Federal Films. In Pates v. COMELEC, e.b., 30 June 2009, the Petitioner received the resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division on 4 February 2008. On 8 February 2008, the Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution which motion was elevated to the COMELEC en banc for resolution. On 22 September 2008 the Petitioner received the resolution of COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration.
On 22 October 2008, Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court his petition for certiorari under R64 to set aside the COMELEC en banc’s resolution. The Supreme Court stated that since the Petitioner had used up 4 days at the time he filed his motion for reconsideration on 8 February, then his remaining period was only 26 days, not 30 days. Hence the Petition, which was filed on the 30th day from notice of the denial of his motion for reconsideration, was filed out of time.
The Supreme Court appeared to have committed an oversight in stating that Petitioner had a remaining period of 26 days. The Petitioner actually had 27 days left. The day when he filed his motion for reconsideration (February 8), which interrupts the running of the period, is excluded in the computation of the period and thus forms part of the remaining period counted from notice of denial of the motion. The petitioner had thus consumed only three days of his 30-day period. (See Section 2 of Rule 22; De las Alas v. CA). Hence the remaining period is 27 (not 26) days and thus the last day of the remaining period fell on 19 October 2008 (Sunday) and not 18 October 2008 (Saturday). The oversight nonetheless did not affect the correctness of the result since Petitioner had filed his petition on 22 October 2008, which was still beyond the effective last day of 20 October 2008 (Monday).
In Madera v. Court of Appeals, e.b., 8 September 2020, the Supreme Court also appeared to have committed an oversight in applying the Federal Films method of computation. There the petitioners received a copy of the Commission on Audit’s decision on 23 February 2018. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on 28 February 2018 and they received a copy of the resolution denying their motion on 12 November 2018. The Court stated that the petitioners had 25 days from 12 November or until 7 December 2018 within which to file their petition for review with the Supreme Court. Again this computation is not in accord with Rule 22. When the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on 28 February 2018, they consumed only 4 days (not five) of their 30-day period. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 22 and the De las Alas case, the day on which the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (28 February) shall be excluded from the computation. Hence the petitioners actually had 26 days (not 25) from 12 November or until 8 December 2018 within which to file the petition for review. 8 December 2018 being a Saturday, the period to file the petition was extended to 10 December 2018. The Supreme Court nevertheless took cognizance of the petition for review despite its late filing invoking its equity jurisdiction.
It is submitted that notwithstanding the Pates and Madera cases, the method of computation used in De las Alas and Lloren, as codified in Rule 22, is still the controlling rule. A perusal of Pates and Madera will show that the method of computation under Rule 22 was not decisive of those cases and hence the portion of the rulings applying such method should be considered merely as obiter dictum. It is important however to clarify the matter as one day could make the difference on whether a petition for review under Rule 64 was timely filed after denial of a motion for reconsideration or new trial or whether an answer was timely filed after the denial of a motion to dismiss or of a motion for a bill of particulars.
Illustration
Q Plaintiff filed a complaint for sum of money before the RTC against the Defendant. Summons and a copy of the complaint was served upon the Defendant on July 1. On July 25, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and he received the order denying the motion to dismiss on August 1. What is the last day for the Defendant to file his answer?
A August 8. On July 25, the Defendant had six days left to file his answer on July 31. When he filed his motion to dismiss on July 25, that day is excluded from the computation and thus forms part of the remaining period. The day of the act causing the interruption (July 25) is excluded from the computation, that is, defendant is not deemed to have consumed the same. Hence the Defendant had all in all seven days from August 1 or until August 8 to file his answer.
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