In a judgment acquitting an accused, may civil liability arising from a source other than crime be adjudged against him? This question was tackled by the Supreme Court en banc in the case of Llonillo v. People, G.R. No. 246787, 30 January 2024.
In Llonillo, the petitioners spouses were charged with the crime of other deceits punished under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that petitioners enticed the private complainant to lend them ₱300,000 secured by a sangla-tira arrangement; that under the arrangement, the private complainant would be entitled to the monthly rentals of Unit H of petitioners’ building; that petitioners falsely represented that Unit H was unencumbered; and that the petitioners have not paid the ₱300,000 to the private complainant.
The petitioners admitted having borrowed ₱300,000 from the private complainant under the sangla-tira arrangement but denied having represented that Unit H was unencumbered.
The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners on the ground that their liability was only civil since the transaction between the petitioner and the private complainant was one of loan. The Court found that there was no false pretense because the private complainant was aware even prior to the transaction that Unit H was mortgaged to a bank.
The issue was whether the private complainant may be awarded civil liability ex contractu despite the acquittal of the petitioners. Stated differently, in case of acquittal of an accused, may civil liability arising from sources other than the offense charged be adjudged in the same criminal action?
It may seem that civil liability arising from a source other than crime may not be adjudged in a criminal case because what is deemed instituted in a criminal action under Section 1(a), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is only the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense charged or civil liability ex delicto. In Dy v. People, 800 SCRA 29 (2016), it was held that civil liability ex contractu cannot be awarded in case of the accused’s acquittal since it is only the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto which is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
The Court in Llonillo however held that notwithstanding the limitation under Section 1(a) of Rule 111, civil liability arising from a source other than crime may be awarded despite an acquittal. This is pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 120 which provides that in an acquittal, “the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.” The Court thus held that the petitioners were civilly liable to the private complainant under the loan contract. Llonillo is thus a clear rejection of the doctrine espoused in Dy.
One of the reasons cited in Dy in support of its holding was that awarding in a criminal case civil liability arising from a source other than crime would violate the accused’s right to due process. This argument was rejected in Llonillo. The Court stated that if the act or omission complained of in the criminal action is the same or is related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability arising from sources other than the delict, the accused should already be prepared to defend themselves against civil liability arising from these other sources. The Court said that the accused cannot claim that they were deprived of due process if based on this single act or omission, they are acquitted but are made civilly liable for the same act or omission.
The Supreme Court laid down the parameters for the award of civil liability based on sources other than the delict: (1) the act or omission complained of in the criminal action is the same or is related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability, (2) the civil liability of the accused was raised in the criminal action, (3) the accused was given the opportunity to be heard on this point, and (4) the civil liability of the accused was established by a preponderance of evidence.
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