In Mallion v. Alcantara, 506 SCRA 336 (2006), the petitioner husband filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage on the ground of the psychological incapacity of his wife (respondent). After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the petition because the husband failed to prove his wife’s psychological incapacity. The judgment having become final, the husband filed another petition for nullification of the marriage, this time on the ground that his marriage had been celebrated without a license. The issue is whether the second action was barred by the judgment in the first.
The petitioner argued that the second action was not barred by the judgment in the first because the two involve different causes of action. The petitioner contended that the two petitions were anchored on separate causes of action because the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was based on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent was different from the evidence necessary to sustain the second petition which was anchored on the absence of a marriage license.
In rejecting the petitioner’s argument and ruling that the second petition was barred by the judgment in the first, the Supreme Court held that in both petitions, the petitioner had the same cause of action, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent; what was different was the ground upon which the cause of action was predicated. Hence, since the petitioner failed to raise the issue of absence of a license in the first case, he could no longer raise it in the second. The Court stated thus:
“The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.”
In so reasoning, the Court is evidently following the rule on bar by prior judgment under Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads as follows:
“SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
“(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
“(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
“(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (49a)”
[Emphasis added]
Res judicata embraces two concepts: bar by prior judgment under Section 47(b) and conclusiveness of judgment or collateral estoppel under Section 47(c). For bar by prior judgment to apply, there must be identity of subject matter, parties, and cause of action between the two actions or proceedings. Collateral estoppel requires only identity of subject matter and of parties (Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 755 SCRA 1, 10-13 [2015]).
A key difference between bar by prior judgment and collateral estoppel is the extent of preclusion: bar by prior judgment is conclusive not only on matters directly adjudged in the first case but also “as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto.” On the other hand, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation only of an issue which was directly adjudged in the first case or which was actually and necessarily included in or necessary to the judgment in the first case.
My view is that in Mallion, the husband’s second petition was not barred by prior judgment. The rule on bar by prior judgment is not applicable to a petition for nullification of marriage because there is no cause of action to speak of; there is no act or omission by which one party violated the right of another. What the petition seeks to establish is a particular fact, i.e., the nullity of the marriage. It is thus an action in rem (Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, 18 SCRA 450 [1966]).
What should instead apply is the rule on collateral estoppel under Section 47(c). The first and second petitions involve the same parties and subject-matter. While the petitioner was barred from relitigating the issue or matter on psychological incapacity, he was not precluded from invoking absence of a license as a ground for a second petition for nullification of marriage because this matter or issue was not directly adjudged in the first case.
-oOo-
Dear Prof.
I agree with your criticism of Mallion v. Alcantara.
First, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is not an ordinary civil action, which is based on a cause of action defined by the rules as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Is is a special proceeding for a declaration of a status of a person. Such is the case that the Supreme Court deemed it proper to promulgate separate rules for the litigation of such a proceeding.
But even if we concede that it is an ordinary civil action based on a cause of action, it is submitted that Mallion v. Alcantara was wrong to hold that the declaration of nullity of marriage is a cause of action. A declaration of nullity of marriage is the objective of the case and the “grounds” alluded to by Mallion v. Alcantara are the causes of action.
By analogy, when an action for unlawful detainer is filed for a breach of a provision in the contract of lease, which by contract is a ground for termination of the lease, a second action for unlawful detainer based on a different ground may still be instituted even though both actions may result in the ejectment of the lessee.
The same situation may obtain in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. While it may be conceded that a petitioner ought to put forward all grounds available for the declaration of nullity of marriage at the time of filing, this does not necessarily mean that any ground not so alleged can no longer be raised in a subsequent petition. This is so because there is that possibility that at the time the first petition was filed, the later ground was not available or apparent to the petitioner.
Take a situation where after the judgment dismissing a Petition for Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity for failure to prove the same became final and executory it was found out that one of the parties had been married but the certificate of marriage had not been registered with the Civil Registrar, it cannot be said that the petitioner is barred from filing another petition based on said ground because he impliedly waived the same.
Mallion v. Alcantara needs to be revisited and a definitive ruling must be laid down by the Supreme Court sitting en banc.