In a criminal case, the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense charged (civil liability ex delicto) is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives such civil action, reserves its filing, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[1] If the accused is acquitted, may the offended party recover civil liability from the accused?
Recovery of Civil Liability Ex Delicto
Whether the offended party may recover civil liability ex delicto depends upon the nature of the acquittal.
There are two kinds of acquittal in relation to their effect on the accused’s civil liability.[2] The first is when the prosecution’s evidence merely failed to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For brevity and for lack of a better term, we can call this as a “relative acquittal.” Such an acquittal does not rule out the imposition of civil liability ex delicto because this needs to be proved only by preponderance of evidence.
The second is when the prosecution’s evidence absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused. Otherwise put, the criminal court has made a categorical finding that no crime was committed or that if one was committed it was not the accused who did so. We may call this kind of acquittal an “absolute acquittal.” Such an acquittal necessarily obliterates the accused’s civil liability ex delicto.
Whether an acquittal is relative or absolute may not be easy to discern. The rules thus require that in an acquittal, “the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist” to avoid any doubt as to the nature of the acquittal.[3]
Recovery of Civil Liability in Case of an Absolute Acquittal
While an absolute acquittal closes the door to an award of civil liability ex delicto, it is not altogether clear if such an acquittal would leave open the possibility of the offended party recovering in the same criminal case the civil liability arising from a source other than the offense charged.
From a reading of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability ex delicto. This supports the view that a criminal court may award only civil liability ex delicto and not that arising from other sources like contract. On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure defines judgment as “the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any,” without stating whether or not such civil liability arises from the offense charged. This seems to support the view that the criminal court may award civil liability not arising from the offense charged.
There have been divergent rulings by the Supreme Court on the matter. In the 1955 case of De Guzman v. Alvia,[4] the accused was acquitted of estafa through misappropriation on the ground that there was no misappropriation on her part since she had entrusted the jewel to another person who was the one who absconded with the jewel. The Court, nonetheless, upheld the imposition of civil liability on the accused since she received the jewel under an agreement to return it if unsold. It should be noted that the liability of the accused was sourced not from crime but from contract.
However, in the subsequent case of People v. Pantig,[5]the Court held that civil liability ex contractu may not be awarded in a criminal case. In Pantig, the accused was charged with estafa for fraudulently obtaining ₱1,200 from the offended party. The trial court acquitted the defendant, finding that the money was received by the defendant as a loan, but ordered the defendant to pay the offended party the ₱1,200. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the award of civil indemnity, stating that the liability of the defendant for the return of the ₱1,200 arose from a civil contract and not a criminal act and hence may not be enforced in the criminal case but in a separate civil action.[6]
The rule that the accused’s civil liability ex contractu had to be recovered in a separate civil action in case of an acquittal was roundly criticized. It was argued that the rule led to multiplicity of suits, added to the congestion of court dockets, and resulted in duplication of proof and litigation. It was suggested instead that the recovery of civil liability even if not arising from the offense charged may be obtained in the criminal action, provided that such liability is proved by a preponderance of evidence.[7]
Heeding these criticisms and suggestions, the Supreme Court en banc in the leading case of Padilla v. Court of Appeals[8] laid down the rule that even in case of an absolute acquittal, the accused’s civil liability may be recovered in the same criminal case.
In Padilla, the accused police officers, on order of the accused mayor, forcibly opened and then demolished the stall of the offended party and carted away the goods found therein. At the time of the demolition and seizure, the offended party was not in his market stall.
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the crime charged in the information, that is, grave coercion, had not been committed since the violence employed was not against persons but against property of the offended party.[9] Nonetheless, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein, existed and was not denied by the accused. The Court thus upheld the imposition of civil liability upon the accused even if it did not arise from the offense charged.
In 2016, however, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Dy v. People,[10] which in effect reverted to the ruling in Pantig.
The facts of Dy are as follows: The accused Dy was the general manager of MCC Inc. (MCCI) In 2002, Mandy, the President of MCCI, charged Dy with estafa claiming that he (Mandy) entrusted checks payable to cash with a total face value of ₱21 million to Dy for the latter to encash and then to pay the proceeds to MCCI’s creditor bank; however Dy instead of paying the bank, pocketed the proceeds. The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Dy. The RTC found that the understanding between Mandy and Dy was that the latter was entitled to the proceeds of the checks, albeit with the obligation on her part of paying MCCI’s bank loan using her own checks. The RTC thus found that the transaction between Mandy and Dy was in fact a loan. Although it acquitted Dy, the RTC in its decision ordered her to pay Mandy ₱21 million. The Court of Appeals affirmed on appeal.
On petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision and set aside the award of ₱21 million, without prejudice to any civil action that may be filed to recover the same. The Court held that in case of an acquittal, the criminal court cannot impose civil liability ex contractu upon the accused and that such liability must be recovered in a separate civil action.
The holding that a criminal court in case of an acquittal cannot award civil liability not arising from the offense charged was followed in in Tayamen v. People,[11] and in Wong v. Wong.[12] On the other hand, the Padilla holding was followed in Vicente v. People,[13] and in De Leon v. Roqson Industrial Sales, Inc.[14]
Padilla should still be considered as the controlling case law
A reading of Dy leaves no doubt regarding its intention to expressly overrule or supersede prior doctrine that civil liability not arising from crime may be awarded in the same criminal case in the event of an accused’s acquittal.[15]
The doctrinal force of Dy (which was promulgated by a division), however, would come up against a constitutional roadblock. Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution provides “[t]hat no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.” By command of the Constitution, cases where the Supreme Court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down either en banc or in division must be heard en banc.[16] The Padilla doctrine cannot be reversed or modified except by the Court en banc.
Padilla is more persuasive
While the holding in Dy and other cases have reasons to commend them, it is opined that the Padilla ruling that a criminal court can award civil liability not arising from the offense charged in an absolute acquittal is more persuasive. The adverse effects of the reversion to the pre-Padilla regime are not hard to imagine. Congestion of court dockets would worsen, and the glacial pace of litigation would become even slower since offended parties would have to go back to litigate anew to recover the civil liability. The cost of litigation would increase since facts which may already have been established by evidence or by admissions have to be proved again by the private complainants.
A litigator confronted with a judgment denying or not awarding civil liability in case of an absolute acquittal has two remedies. He may appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment. He can also file a separate civil action. These remedies may be availed of simultaneously since the action to enforce civil liability not arising from the crime is an independent civil action.[17] The litigator however must consider the statute of limitations in filing the separate civil action. The reason is that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the tolling of the prescriptive period is not applicable to an independent civil action.
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[1] Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[2] See Section 2, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[3] Id. See also Article 29, Civil Code.
[4] 96 Phil. 558 (1955), Montemayor, J.
[5] 97 Phil. 748 (1955), Labrador, J.
[6] Id. at 750.
[7] See ALFREDO F. TADIAR, CRITICAL ANALYSES OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM 1983 UP TO MARCH 1990, p. 237 (1990).
[8] 129 SCRA 558 (1984).
[9] While the Court of Appeals characterized its acquittal as based on reasonable doubt, a careful reading shows that the basis for the acquittal was actually a definitive finding that the offense charged (grave coercion) could not have been committed by the accused since the violence was employed only upon things and not persons.
[10] 800 SCRA 39 (2016), 3rd Division, Jardeleza, J.
[11] 28 April 2021, Delos Santos, J.
[12] 29 September 2021, Inting, J.
[13] 3 March 2021, Carandang, J.
[14] 23 November 2021, Caguioa, J. Here the civil liability arose from law, specifically, Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law on accommodation party.
[15] For instance, Dy states that it shall serve as a lodestar to litigants regarding their course of action in recovering civil liability in criminal cases (Dy v. People, supra note 23 at 64).
[16] JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER 334 (2011 ed.).
[17] See Article 31, Civil Code. In the 1964 Rules, Article 31 was included in the enumeration of independent civil actions. The deletion of Article 31 from Section 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure did not mean that it is no longer independent of the criminal action. Such deletion was simply because of the semantic consideration that Article 31 does not refer to civil liability ex delicto and thus strictly speaking should not have been included in Rule 111 which in the main refers to a civil action to recover civil liability ex delicto.
