May a child impugn his or her own legitimacy?
Article 164 of the Family Code lays down the presumption that “[c]hildren conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” In other words, the husband of a woman is presumed to be the father of the child to whom she gives birth. Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code also provide that only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs may impugn the legitimacy of the child. Under Article 167, the mother herself may not impugn the legitimacy of the child. The reason behind these provisions is evidently to protect the dignity and honor of the husband.
Hence, a child may not impugn his or her own legitimacy. Otherwise put, a child may not rebut the presumption of his or her own legitimacy.
However, in Yap v. Yap, G.R. No. 222259, 17 October 2022, the Supreme Court held that “[c]hildren who enjoy the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may impugn this presumption through any of the grounds provided under Article 166 of the same Code.”
In Yap, the petitioner, although born during the marriage of her mother to Mr. Lumahang and thus presumed to be legitimate child of Lumahang, sought to establish that she was in fact the illegitimate child of her mother and another man in order to inherit from the latter’s estate. The Supreme Court, invoking “the best interest of the child” standard, allowed her to do so, effectively allowing her to impugn her own legitimacy.
Facts of the case
The petitioner L. Yap was born in 1961 during the marriage of her mother Mrs. Lusterio and Mr. Lumahang. The petitioner however claimed that she is the illegitimate child of her mother and Mr. Yap, a married man. In 1996, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for partition of the estate of Mr. Yap (who had died in 1995) against Mr. Yap’s widow and legitimate children. The petitioner introduced, together with other pieces of evidence, a special power of attorney executed by Mr. Yap in her favor wherein she was referred to as his daughter.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, finding that she was able to prove that she was the illegitimate daughter of Mr. Yap. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, stating that since L. was born during the subsistence of Lusterio and Lumahang’s marriage, she is presumed to be the legitimate child of Lumahang and that such presumption of legitimacy can be impugned only by Lumahang or, in proper cases, Lumahang’s heirs pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code.
Holding of the Court
The Supreme Court on appeal reversed the Court of Appeals and held that L may establish her filiation to Mr. Yap, in effect allowing L to impugn her own legitimacy. The Court remanded the case to the RTC for the reception of additional evidence, including DNA evidence.
The Court emphasized that being a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, “the Philippines has bound itself to abide by [the] universal standards on children’s rights embodied” in the Convention, including the “best interests of the child” standard in actions concerning children.[1] Applying this standard, the Court held that is in the best interests of the petitioner to allow her to prove and establish her true filiation.
Regarding Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code which provide that only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs may impugn the legitimacy of the child, the Court stated that “[i]n this day and age, the theory that only the father is affected by the infidelity of the wife no longer holds true. The circumstances under which these children are conceived and born have an impact on their rights and privileges.” The Court stated that “it would be antithetical to the best interests of the child should the Petition be denied based merely on the archaic view that only the husband is ‘directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces.’”[2]
Remarks on Yap
It is opined that the ruling in Yap should be considered only as pro hac vice and not as controlling case law. The provisions of Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, archaic or paternalistic though they may be, are still binding law until amended or repealed by Congress.
Article 3.1 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child by itself cannot override the provisions of Articles 164, 170, and 171 of the Family Code. Article 3.1 simply provides that “[i]n all actions concerning children … the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Assuming that the limitations in Articles 170 and 171 are no longer in the best interests of a child, the remedy under Article 4 of the convention would be for a state party to undertake the appropriate legislative measure.
The argument that it is “illogical to adhere to the presumption of legitimacy despite considerable evidence to the contrary” ignores the prevailing rule that it is only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs who are allowed to rebut the presumption in Article 164. A child who was conceived or born during a valid and existing marriage has no right to impugn his or her own legitimacy under the Family Code. The child cannot choose his or her own filiation.[3]
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[1] Article 3.1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
[2] Italics supplied.
[3] Ordoña v. Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370, 9 November 2021 (e.b.).
