Try answering the following question on your own:
The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) received a copy of the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) on 11 December 2012. The PSALM filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on 19 December 2012. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the COA in a resolution which was received by the PSALM on 28 January 2014. When is the last day for the PSALM to file the petition for review under Rule 64 with the Supreme Court?
Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the petition for review of the judgment of the COA shall be filed with the Supreme Court within 30 days from notice of the judgment. If a motion for reconsideration is timely filed and then denied, the movant may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Applying this provision, the Supreme Court in PSALM v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211376, e.b., 7 December 2021, stated that the last day to file the petition was 19 February 2014.
“Here, PSALM received a copy of the assailed Decision … on December 11, 2012; thus, it had 30 days therefrom within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 64. Notably, PSALM’s Motion for Reconsideration, which was timely filed on December 19, 2012, tolled the running of the 30-day reglementary period and left it with 22 days within which to file the petition, reckoned from PSALM’s receipt of the denial of the motion. Counting the 22 days from PSALM’s receipt of the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration on January 28, 2014, the last day for filing the petition fell on February 19, 2014.”
With due respect, it is submitted that the last day to file the petition for review was on 20 February 2014.
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule for computing reglementary periods:
“In computing any period of time prescribed and allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included…. (Section 1, Rule 22, emphasis supplied).
“Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period. (Section 2, Rule 22, emphasis supplied).”[1]
Applying Rule 22 to the problem, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run, that is, 11 December 2012, is excluded in the computation of the period. Likewise, the day of the act that caused the interruption, that is, 19 December 2012, shall also be excluded. Hence, the PSALM used up only seven (not eight) days when it filed the motion for reconsideration on 19 December 2012. Thus, the PSALM still had 23 (not 22) days from 28 January 2014 to file the petition for review with the Supreme Court or up to 20 February 2014.
The imprecision in the computation may be explained thus: it appears logical to conclude that when the motion for reconsideration was filed on 19 December 2012, the movant had used up eight days (19-11). However, as earlier elucidated upon and after applying Rule 22, the movant had in fact used up only seven days.
This may be better illustrated if we assume a hypothetical appeal period of one day from notice of the judgment or final order. A judgment was received on 11 December 2012 and a motion for reconsideration was filed by the aggrieved party the next day (the last day in fact) on 12 December 2012. The resolution denying the motion was received by the movant on 28 January 2014. If we were to say that the movant had used up one day (12-11), then there would be no more remaining period and the judgment would have become final and unappealable. Of course, this should not be the case since the movant would still have one day from notice of the denial on 28 January or until 29 January to file his appeal. This is because both 11 and 12 December are excluded from the computation pursuant to Rule 22 and thus the movant is not deemed to have consumed any period when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
-oOo-
[1] Section 2, Rule 22 applies the method of computation used in Lloren v. De Veyra, 4 SCRA 637 (1962), and in De las Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200 (1978) while abandoning that used in Federal Films, Inc. v. David, 78 Phil. 472. However, in two cases aside from PSALM v. COA, that is, Pates v. COMELEC, e.b., 30 June 2009, and Madera v. Court of Appeals, e.b., 8 September 2020, the Court applied the Federal Films method. It is respectfully submitted that this method of computation should be re-examined. See also part 1 of this blog which was posted on 12 April 2021.
