In Consing v. People, 701 SCRA 132 (2013), the Supreme Court held that an independent civil action based on fraud did not raise a prejudicial question that would suspend a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa. The Court justified its ruling on the reasoning that “the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.”
However, in Domingo v. Singson, 822 SCRA 401 (2017), the Supreme Court held that a civil case for the nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of forgery posed a prejudicial question to a criminal case for falsification of public document involving the same deed. The Court rejected the argument that an independent civil action cannot raise a prejudicial question by stating that “[t]he concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this case.”
The Consing holding has been cited in well-known works on criminal procedure and has apparently overshadowed Domingo. However, it is opined that the Domingo ruling, which discounted the application of the concept of independent civil actions to the issue of whether there is a prejudicial question, is more in accord with the law.
Consing v. People (2013)
In Consing, the petitioner for himself and his mother (De la Cruz) obtained a loan of ₱18 million from Unicapital secured by a real estate mortgage on a property allegedly owned by De la Cruz. It was later discovered that the certificate of title over the property was spurious and that it was actually registered in the name of another person. Unicapital demanded from the petitioner and his mother the return of the ₱18 million.
In August 1999, Unicapital sued the petitioner in the RTC of Makati for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The complaint alleged that the petitioner and De la Cruz had acted in a “wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security a property which they do not own and foisting to the public a spurious title.” The petitioner raised the defense that he did not falsify the certificate of title or willfully defraud Unicapital.
In January 2000, the city prosecutor filed with the RTC of Makati an information against the petitioner and De la Cruz for estafa through falsification of public document.* The petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the civil case. The petitioner argued that the question in the civil case of whether or not he had falsified the certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital was determinative of his guilt or innocence in the criminal case.
The Supreme Court held that there was no prejudicial question raised by the civil case. The Court stated that a civil action based on fraud may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case; this is “because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.”
The Court said that a perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud: the complaint alleged that the petitioner and de la Cruz had acted in a “wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title.” As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of the criminal case pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code and thus would not pose a prejudicial question.
Domingo v. Singson (2017)
In Domingo, the plaintiffs filed with the RTC an action to nullify a deed of sale over a parcel of land allegedly executed by their late parents, stating that their parents’ signatures were forged. The defendant countered that the signatures were genuine. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the prosecutor for estafa through falsification of public document against the defendant. The prosecutor filed the information in court. The defendant filed a motion to suspend the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question. The plaintiffs opposed, arguing that the action to nullify the deed of sale was based on fraud and thus an independent civil action which could not pose a prejudicial question.
The Court held that the action to nullify the deed of sale on the ground of fraud posed a prejudicial question. The Court said that the main issue raised in the civil case,the genuineness of the signature of the plaintiffs’ parents appearing in the deed of sale, is intimately related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public document; the resolution of the main issue in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence in the criminal case. Hence, the criminal case should be suspended.
The Court rejected the argument that the civil action was an independent civil action, stating that the concept of independent civil actions finds no application.
Conflict between Consing and Domingo
It is evident that there is a conflict between Consing and Domingo on whether an independent civil action would raise a prejudicial question.
As stated at the outset, the Supreme Court in Consing held that an independent civil action based on fraud does not raise a prejudicial question that would suspend a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. The Court anchored its holding on the reasoning that “the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.”
It may be seen that the holding commits the fallacy of petitio principii, that is, an argument in which the desired conclusion itself serves as its own premise or basis. Stripped to its core, the argument is that an independent civil action cannot raise a prejudicial question because an independent civil action cannot raise a prejudicial question.
The Consing holding also conflates the concept of an independent civil action with that of a prejudicial question. The two concepts are separate and distinct from each other. When the question is whether the civil action will be suspended, the applicable rule is that on independent civil actions. The civil action will not be suspended if it is an independent one.
On the other hand, when the question is whether the criminal action will be suspended, the applicable rule is that on prejudicial questions. The question to be asked is if the civil action raises a prejudicial question; if it does, then the criminal action will be suspended during the pendency of the civil case. There is no point in inquiring if the civil action is an independent one since it is not the action sought to be suspended.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the elements of a prejudicial question: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. There is no requirement in said section or any other that the civil action must not be an independent civil action.
It is thus opined that the Consing doctrine deserves a serious re-examination and that the Domingo ruling is more in accord with the law governing prejudicial questions.
-oOo-
* A criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents was filed in July 1999 against the petitioner and De la Cruz. However, at times material to the Consing case, the amendment of Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring that the civil case be instituted before the criminal case had not yet taken effect. The amendment took effect only on 1 December 2000. (A.M. No. 00-05-03-SC, dated 3 October 2000).
