In the case of People v. Camenforte, G.R. No. 220916, 14 June 2021,[1] the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a criminal case for falsification based on a final judgment in a civil case that the sellers’ signatures in the deeds of sale were genuine. The Supreme Court anchored the dismissal of the criminal case not on res judicata but on the existence of a prejudicial question.
Camenforte is noteworthy for two reasons. First. The application of the doctrine of prejudicial question arose not from a pending civil case but from a final one and served as a ground for dismissing, not merely suspending, the criminal case. Second. The Court held that the requirement in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that the civil case be instituted ahead of the criminal action in order to raise a prejudicial question is merely directory and not mandatory.
The Camenforte case
In Camenforte, three deeds of sale over several parcels of land were recorded in the registry of deeds. The spouses Granda were indicated as the sellers, with the Uy siblings appearing as the buyers in two deeds of sale while Lastrilla was the buyer in the third deed of sale. The certificates of title in the name of the spouses Granda were cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the name of the buyers.
Subsequently, Rafael Granda, a grandson of the spouses Granda (who had died in the meantime), filed a criminal complaint for falsification against the notary public Camenforte, the Uy siblings, and Lastrilla. Rafael alleged that the respondents falsified the signature of his grandparents in the deeds of sale. In due course, the criminal informations for falsification were filed against Camenforte and Lastrilla and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.
While the criminal cases were pending, Benjamin Granda (a son of the spouses Granda) filed a civil complaint for nullification of the deeds of sale and certificates of title against the Uy siblings and Lastrilla. The civil complaint was raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Tacloban City.
The RTC in the civil case rendered a decision dismissing the complaint after finding that the spouses Granda’s signatures in the deeds of sale were not forged. Plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed and an entry of judgment was thereafter issued.
Accused Camenforte and Lastrilla then filed motions to dismiss the criminal cases on the grounds of res judicata and the existence of a prejudicial question. May the criminal cases be dismissed on these grounds?
Analogous application of the doctrine of prejudicial question
The Supreme Court held that the criminal cases may not be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The Court agreed with the People’s argument that there was no res judicata because there was no identity of parties in the civil and criminal cases, the People not being a party to the civil case.
The Court however held that the criminal cases may be dismissed on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. The question in the civil case of whether the signature of the spouses Granda in the deeds of sale were forged or not is determinative of whether the criminal actions for falsification may proceed. Since the RTC in the civil case had found that the spouses Granda’s signatures were genuine, the continuing prosecution of the criminal cases for falsification is barred by operation of the doctrine of prejudicial question.
The Court held that although the civil case was instituted after the criminal cases, this did not preclude the application of the doctrine of prejudicial question. The Court stated that the strict sequence of institution of the two actions as provided for by Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is “more directory than mandatory and must give way to the chief litmus test of whether the two actions involve prejudicial issues and facts that are similar or otherwise intimately related so that a resolution in one concludes the resolution in the other.”
The dismissal of the criminal cases is more precisely anchored on res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment
It is opined that the more precise reason for the dismissal of the criminal cases is res judicata, more specifically, conclusiveness of judgment. The Supreme Court eschewed the application of res judicata on the reasoning that there was no identity of parties in the civil and criminal cases, the People not being a party to the civil case. However, strict or absolute identity of parties is not required for res judicata to apply; substantial identity is sufficient.[2]
In Camenforte, there was substantial identity of parties between the civil and criminal cases as both the plaintiff in the civil case and the private complainant in the criminal cases represented the same interest, that is, the interest of the heirs of the spouses Granda. Since there was identity of parties and subject matter between the civil and the criminal cases, conclusiveness of judgment or collateral estoppel would bar relitigating the finding in the civil case that the seller’s signatures in the deeds of sale were authentic.
That the People was not a party to the civil case would not militate against the res judicata or preclusive effect of the civil case. The preclusive effect of a civil case on the criminal case is in fact recognized by the doctrine of prejudicial question and is inherent in the definition of a prejudicial question as one the resolution of which “determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.”[3]
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment applies also in criminal cases.[4] Supreme Court decisions have applied the doctrine to situations involving a civil or administrative case on one hand and a criminal case on the other. Where the will of a deceased wife had been allowed in the probate proceedings, the criminal case against the husband for falsification of the will was dismissed on the ground of res judicata, the allowance of the will being conclusive as to its due execution.[5] The final finding by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in an agrarian case that a person was a bona fide tenant is conclusive and binding upon a criminal court and precluded his conviction for theft for harvesting abaca hemp without the landowner’s consent.[6]
Doctrine of prejudicial question not strictly applicable but applicable by analogy
Two reasons militate against the strict application of the doctrine of prejudicial question to the fact setting of Camenforte.
The text of Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure shows that a prejudicial question necessarily presupposes that the civil case is still pending. This in turn is logically intertwined with the rule that a prejudicial question is a ground merely for suspending the criminal case, not dismissing it.[7] Once the civil case becomes final, the concept of prejudicial question segues into the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
The holding that the requirement of the prior institution of the civil action is merely directory and not mandatory should be limited to the fact setting of Camanforte
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that one of “the elements of a prejudicial question” is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action.” (Italics supplied). The combined effect of the words elements, previously, and subsequent is to lead to no other conclusion than that the civil action must be instituted prior to the criminal action for a prejudicial question to arise. No prejudicial question exists if the criminal action was instituted ahead of the civil action.[8]
The Court held that the rule regarding the strict sequence of institution of the two actions is “more directory than mandatory and must give way to the chief litmus test of whether the two actions involve prejudicial issues and facts that are similar or otherwise intimately related so that a resolution in one concludes the resolution in the other.”
It is submitted that this holding should be restricted to Camanforte’s fact setting, i.e., the situation where there was already entry of judgment in the civil case. In such a case, the analogous application of the prejudicial-question doctrine is in effect an application of the concept of res judicata. Unlike in the rule on prejudicial question, there is no requirement in res judicata that the precluding case be instituted ahead of the other.
Conclusion
A perusal of Camenforte shows that it involved not a strict but an analogous application of the doctrine of prejudicial question.[9] Hence, the pronouncements in Camenforte relating to the doctrine of prejudicial question should be circumscribed to the fact setting therein and not read as modifying or repealing the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as settled case law.[10]
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[1] Penned by Supreme Court Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.
[2] Santos v. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 288 (1972).
[3] Section 7(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[4] Ligtas v. People, 767 SCRA 1, 28 (2015).
[5] Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938).
[6] Ligtas v. People, supra.
[7] Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625, 629 (1992).
[8] Torres v. Garchitorena, 394 SCRA 494, 509 (2002).
[9] The decision itself uses the term “analogous application.” (At p. 13).
[10] The Constitution provides “that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.” (Sec. 4[3], Art. VIII).
