One of the grounds of a motion to quash an information is that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. (Section 3[d], Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure). Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the failure to raise a ground of quashal in a motion to quash results in the waiver of that ground, except for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure of the complaint or information to charge an offense, extinction of the criminal action or liability, and double jeopardy. Since the ground under Section 3(d) was not among those excepted from the general rule, it appears that such ground is waived if not raised in a motion to quash.
However, the prevailing case law was that an information filed by a prosecutor or officer who had no authority to do so is a jurisdictional defect. The reason was that a valid information filed by a qualified and authorized officer is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Being a jurisdictional defect, the lack of authority of the filing officer was a ground which was not waived even if not raised in a motion to quash and thus could be raised even after plea. (Villa v. Ibañez, 88 Phil. 402 [1951], reiterated in Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 [1998], People v. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 [2004], and other cases).
The filing officer’s lack of authority arises from two situations. The first is when the officer who filed the information is not among those authorized under Section 2 of Rule 117 or the law to conduct a preliminary investigation and to file the corresponding information. For example, in Villa, the lawyer appointed as special counsel by the Secretary of Justice and who filed the information was not an officer or employee of the DOJ and thus could not have qualified as a special counsel empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information pursuant to the old Administrative Code. In this situation, the filing officer absolutely has no authority to file the information.
The second is when the filing officer was authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation but did not obtain the prior written approval of the provincial or city prosecutor, prosecutor general, Ombudsman or his deputy to file the information pursuant to Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. An example is an information filed by an assistant city prosecutor (who is authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation) without the prior written approval of the city prosecutor. (See Quisay v. People, 781 SCRA 98 [2016]).
The Villa case ossified into well-entrenched doctrine which held sway for almost seven decades. It even became the subject of quite a few bar examination questions.
In 2019, a shot over the bow of the Villa doctrine was fired by Ongkingco v. Sugiyama, G.R. No. 217787, 18 September 2019. In Ongkingco, an information was filed by the investigating prosecutor without the prior written approval of the city prosecutor. The accused argued that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. The Court held that the accused was estopped from raising this ground since he raised it for the first time only in the Supreme Court. The Court also cited Section 9 of Rule 117 which provides that a ground of a motion to quash is waived if not raised in such motion. The reasoning in Ongkingco presaged the Gomez ruling. However, since Ongkingco was rendered only by a division of the Supreme Court, it could not be deemed as having overturned the Villa doctrine pursuant to Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.
In Villa Gomez v. People, G.R. No. 216824, 10 November 2020, the Supreme Court en banc had the opportunity to tackle a case involving the filing officer’s lack of authority under the second situation. In Villa Gomez, the accused was arrested without warrant after an entrapment operation. After the inquest, an information for corruption of public officials was filed with the RTC of Makati City against the accused. The information was signed by the assistant city prosecutor (ACP) of Makati City and contained his certification that it was filed with the prior authority of the city prosecutor. After trial on the merits and submission of the case for decision, the RTC motu proprio issued an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC stated that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the information was filed without the prior written authority of the city prosecutor. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which set aside the RTC’s dismissal order and ordered the reinstatement of the criminal case. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. In my view, the Villa Gomez ruling is primarily anchored on two reasons:
First. The ACP was in fact authorized by the city prosecutor to file the information in court as shown by the ACP’s resolution recommending the filing of the information and which resolution contains the city prosecutor’s written approval. The Court held that there is no law which requires that the reviewing officer’s prior written authorization appear directly in the information itself. It may be contained in the resolution which is presumed to be attached to the information pursuant to Section 7(a) of Rule 112. The RTC’s failure to take into consideration the resolution was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
Second. Since the accused was arrested without a warrant, the information was filed in court without a preliminary investigation. The requirement of prior written approval in Section 4 of Rule 112 finds no application where the information was filed not after a preliminary investigation but after an inquest. What governs is Section 6 of Rule 112 which provides that the information may be filed by the prosecutor without any need for a prior written approval. The reason is that the exigent need to file the information dispenses with such requirement.
The Court however also tackled the issue of whether the lack of the ACP’s authority to file the information was a jurisdictional defect which was not waivable. The Court held that the ACP’s lack of authority to file the information did not implicate the Court’s subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Not being jurisdictional, such ground was waived by the accused if not raised in a motion to quash. The Court characterized such lack of authority as a mere formal defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings.
What if an information was filed without the prior written authorization of the reviewing officer and a timely motion to quash was filed? Should the court quash the information? Villa Gomez clearly implies that the motion to quash should not be granted as the defect is merely a formal one which could be cured by an amendment.
What if an information was filed by an officer or person who is not among the officers authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2 of Rule 112? Would this ground be also waived if not raised in a motion to quash? It is submitted that the answer is no. A circumspect reading of Villa Gomez, especially its conclusion, shows that its ratio decidendi is limited to the second situation involving failure of the filing officer to obtain the requisite prior written approval. The ratio decidendi does not apply to the first situation involving absolute lack of authority on the part of the filing officer. The information filed would be invalid since the filing officer can hardly be considered a de facto officer and thus the court would not acquire jurisdiction. Hence, the Villa doctrine is still good case law. A careful reading of Villa Gomez shows that what it really does away with is not the Villa doctrine per se but the misapplication of the same. (See concurring opinion of Justice Delos Santos). Villa is limited to the situation where the filing officer had absolutely no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the corresponding information. The Villa doctrine cannot be extended to the second situation where the officer filing the information merely failed to obtain the prior written approval of the reviewing officer.
-oOo-
sir, what then is the point of allowing to raise the issue of failure to obtain prior approval in a motion to quash when it will be dismissed just the same on account of it being a mere formal defect and therefore can be cured by a mere amendment?
The filing officer may have filed it when the reviewing officer’s recommendation is not to file. In which case the defect of the information may not be cured.