The opening paragraph of Alanis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, 11 November 2020, reads as follows:
“Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State’s declared policy to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last name.”
This opening statement electrified the media and the public and led to the widespread belief that a legitimate child is now free to choose his or her mother’s surname rather than that of the father. There were even headlines and articles trumpeting that patriarchy and “antiquated gender roles” have been struck a mortal blow.
A sober reading of the whole case however shows that it does not confer unfettered entitlement to a legitimate child to use the surname of his or her mother. Article 364 of the Civil Code, which provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the father, is still good law unless repealed by Congress. It cannot be repealed by a Supreme Court decision. A perusal of Alfon v. Republic (cited in Alanis) shows that while a legitimate child is not precluded from using his or her mother’s surname, there must be a proper and reasonable cause for it. In both Alfon and Alanis, the proper and reasonable cause was to avoid confusion since the child was using the surname of the mother since childhood.
The hoopla generated by Alanis serves as an occasion for us to revisit the difference between the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. The former is the rationale for the decision and constitutes binding precedent. The ratio decidendi tackles the issue directly raised by the parties and flowing from the facts of the case. Obiter dicta on the other hand are incidental or tangential pronouncements of the court which are not necessary for the holding it reached. While obiter dicta may be persuasive, these in no wise amount to controlling case law.
In Alanis, the petitioner who has been using his mother’s surname Ballaho since childhood wanted to change his surname in his birth certificate from Alanis (his father’s surname) to Ballaho. He invokes avoidance of confusion as his ground considering that he had been using and had been known in his community as Ballaho since childhood. This was denied by the trial court on the ground that it would “even create more confusion because it could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding his parentage and/or paternity.”
The ratio decidendi in Alanis, which is the same as that in Alfon, was that “principally” in Article 364 does not mean “exclusively.” Hence the trial judge erred when he in effect interpreted “principally” in Article 364 as “exclusively” based on his reasoning that for a legitimate child to use the surname of his mother would “even create more confusion because it could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding his parentage and/or paternity.”
The Supreme Court holding in Alanis essentially left untouched and did not diminish the force of Article 364 of the Civil Code which provides that a legitimate child shall principally use the surname of the father. The State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality between men and women had no impact on Article 364 and the jurisprudence interpreting it (such as Alfon) which holds that while “principally” does not mean “exclusively,” it does mean that a legitimate child should still show proper and reasonable cause for using the mother’s surname, as for instance, the avoidance of confusion.
The issue of gender equality however did come into play in the interpretation of Article 364, at least in the way the trial judge in Alanis interpreted it. As stated the trial judge had reasoned that legitimate children cannot use their mothers’ surnames since it would lead to more confusion and questions regarding his “parentage and/or paternity.” The Supreme Court stated that the “trial court’s reasoning further encoded patriarchy into our system.”
It can be seen therefore that the statement regarding gender equality was an obiter dictum. It was not necessary for the holding of the Court since the case could have been decided simply by reference to the Alfon case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court could not let the trial court’s “patriarchal” reasoning pass without comment. The High Tribunal thus took the occasion to remind the courts that “where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.”
In fine, Alanis laid down no new doctrine of law but served as a useful reminder to the courts to keep in mind the policy of gender equality when interpreting the law.
-oOo-
