Tolling of Prescription of Offenses

Brief background

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to the accused.

Prior to 13 November 1988, the controlling doctrine was that it was filing of the complaint or information in court, whether for preliminary investigation or for trial, which interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of offenses (People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, 499-501 [e.b., 1967]). 

While the 1983 case of Francisco v. Court of Appeals,¹ “broadened” the scope of the Olarte ruling by holding that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor also tolls prescription, Francisco’s doctrinal force was not recognized in Section 1, Rule 110 of the original 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which did not contain any provision on prescription. The rejection of Francisco was further shown by Section 6(b), Rule 111 of the original 1985 Rules which provided that “[t]he pendency of a petition for suspension of the criminal action still undergoing preliminary investigation in the fiscal’s office shall interrupt the prescriptive period for filing the corresponding complaint or information.” Obviously, this provision would have been unnecessary if the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor already suspended the running of the prescriptive period.²  The reason why Francisco was not adopted in the original 1985 Rules apparently was that Francisco was rendered by a division and not by the full court.³ 

It was only on 13 November 1988, upon the effectivity of the 1988 Supreme Court resolutions amending the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the rule that the filing of the complaint with the proper officer for preliminary investigation or with the prosecutor also interrupts the running of the prescriptive period came into force.  The 1988 amendments adopted the Francisco doctrine, which had been rejected in the original 1985 Rules, by adding a last paragraph to Section 1 of Rule 110 stating that “[i]n all cases, such institution [including the filing of the complaint with the proper officer or with the prosecutor] shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged.” Consequently, the 1988 amendments also eliminated Section 6(b) of Rule 111.⁴     

Interruption of prescription for violations of special laws and of municipal and city ordinances; Zaldivia v. Reyes (1992)

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, the SC en banc held that the prescriptive period was tolled only upon the filing of the criminal case in court. The Supreme Court cited two reasons for its holding.

First. Violations of special laws and municipal and city ordinances are governed by Act No. 3326 which provides in Section 2 that “the prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.” The Court held that the “proceedings” referred to in Section 2 are judicial proceedings. 

Second. Violations of municipal and city ordinances are governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP).  Under Section 9 of the 1983 RSP, criminal cases are commenced by the filing of the complaint or information in court and hence, it is only from such filing that the prescriptive period is interrupted.⁵  

Panaguiton v. DOJ (2008)

In Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), a prosecution for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Supreme Court, through its second division, held that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor’s office already tolled the running of the prescriptive period even if the offense is for the violation of a special law.  The Supreme Court stated that the word “proceedings” in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 by which prescription is interrupted should be deemed to refer to proceedings both judicial or executive in character.  It pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed in 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and that the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.  The ruling in Panaguiton was reiterated in People v. Pangilinan, 672 SCRA 105 (2012).⁶

Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua (2013)

In Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, 706 SCRA 724 (2013), which involved the violation of a city ordinance, the Supreme Court held that prescription was tolled only upon the filing of the information in court and not upon the filing of the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. Since the two-month prescriptive period for violations of ordinances under Act No. 3326 had already expired when the information was filed in court, the crime was extinguished by prescription.

What is noteworthy about Jadewell is that it discounted the Panaguiton ratio that the proceedings in Act No. 3326 which interrupt prescription include executive or administrative proceedings. Jadewell instead anchored its holding on the Zaldivia ratio that the prescriptive period for violations of municipal and city ordinances is tolled only upon the filing of the complaint or information in court since such violations are governed by the RSP. 

Republic v. Desierto (2023)

In Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, 16 January 2023, the Court stated that the prescriptive period for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint or information in court because B.P. 22 cases are governed by the RSP.⁷ The Court clarified that Panaguiton should be limited to violations of B.P. 22 which were committed before 15 April 2003.  The Court noted that in Panaguiton, the violation of B.P. 22 occurred in 1993 or before B.P. 22 cases were included in the coverage of the RSP effective 15 April 2003.⁸

Corpus v. People (2023)  

In Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 255740, 16 August 2023, the Court held that the two-month prescriptive period for slight physical injuries is interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court and not when the complaint is filed with the prosecutor’s office because a criminal case for slight physical injuries is governed by the RSP.⁹

Summary

The rule is that the running of the prescriptive period for offenses is interrupted upon the institution of the criminal action. Institution of the criminal action refers not only to the filing of the complaint or information in court but also to the filing of the complaint with the proper officer for preliminary investigation or with the office of the prosecutor (Section 1, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure). This rule has been extended by Panaguiton to violations of special laws not covered by the RSP.  

The exception to the general rule is in a criminal case covered by the RSP. In such a situation, the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court. 

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1. 122 SCRA 438 (2^nd Div., 1983). ↩︎
2. JOSE Y. FERIA, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1. ↩︎
3. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc (Sec. 2[3], Art. X, 1973 Constitution). ↩︎
4. JOSE Y. FERIA, 1988 AMENDMENTS TO THE 1985 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1, 8-9. ↩︎
5. Section 9 of the 1983 RSP was reiterated in substance in the 1991 and 2022 RSP. ↩︎
6. My view is that Panaguiton and Pangilinan, which were rendered by divisions, cannot reverse the doctrine laid down the Supreme Court en banc in Zaldivia that the prescriptive period for criminal cases involving violations of special laws is interrupted only upon the filing of the case in court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). Nonetheless, Panaguiton has ossified into settled doctrine and has been followed by the Court in several cases. ↩︎
7. While the statement is obiter, it is persuasive. Desierto, like Jadewell, simply hews to the Zaldivia doctrine. ↩︎
8. A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC, effective 15 April 2003. ↩︎
9. In People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, 27 April 2007 (3^rd Div.), it was held that in a criminal case for slight physical injuries, prescription is already interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the office of the prosecutor.  This holding, which modifies or reverses the en banc ruling in Zaldivia, should be considered as pro hac vice.   ↩︎